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"From the End of a Dream No One Knows" 1.Introduction—The Primordial Problem of Intellect



1.Introduction—The Primordial Problem of Intellect

1-1.The Theory of Idea by Plato and the Definition of Information by Bateson

In “Theaetetus,” Plato made Socrates argue against Protagoras, Heraclitus and Empedokles. He said that these advocates commonly assumed the following.

SOCRATES: I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming.

Theaetetus, by Plato, Translated by Benjamin Jowett, Retrieved November 5, 2023 from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1726/1726-h/1726-h.htm

And in “Phaedo,” Plato made Socrates argue the following.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul. 

Phaedo, by Plato, Translated by Benjamin Jowett, Retrieved November 5, 2023 from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1658/1658-h/1658-h.htm

I know theory of ideas was established under the influence of Parmenides and Pythagoras. However what I want to pay attention to here is that “the immortality of the soul,” theory of ideas is assuming “absoluteness of notions,” the denial of relativity. The unchanging absolute idea is established by the denial of relation to the others. The argument which I’ll start now is not the same as the above advocates. But I believe, here I can show one of the matters which Plato was trying to deny.

On the other hand, let me show the definition of “information” by Gregory Bateson.

In fact, wherever information — or comparison — is of the essence of our explanation, there, for me, is a mental process. Information can be defined as a difference that makes a difference. A sensory end organ is a comparator, a device which responds to difference. Of course, the sensory end organ is material, but it is this responsiveness to difference that we shall use to distinguish its functioning as “mental.” Similarly, the ink on this page is material, but the ink is not my thought. Even at the most elementary level, the ink is not a signal or message. The difference between paper and ink is the signal.

Bateson, Gregory. Bateson, Mary. “The World of Mental Process.” ANGELS FEAR Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred, Macmillan Publishing Company 1987 pp.17

Compared with Plato, the attitude against intellect by Bateson is reversed. The definition “a difference that makes a difference,” can be said almost like liquidity itself, far from the unchanging absolute.

To consider “intellect,” which position should we take? Regarding it, let me think about two things. The first is whether we can judge “something exists” without any occurrence of difference. Consider the following question.

Can we detect existence which makes no difference to anything around it? The answer is no. Because it makes no effect on any measuring instrument. The detection of the difference is the only way for us to regard something as “existing.” And it’s no matter for us, even if something which makes no difference to anything around it exists. Because nothing changes, if it exists or not.

Because the ability of the detection of the difference is the limit of our intellect, and the difference is the moment of “existing” itself, certainly we would find the great importance on the definition of information by Bateson, “a difference that makes a difference.”*1 “Something that makes no difference” is not information, and we cannot cognize its “existence.” We can say that “the difference” is the condition of existence, and along with its companion concept “identity,” it is one of the most important concepts in intellect.

*1 Actually, Plato argued the similar discussion in “Sophist.” Theory of ideas by Plato was my theoretical opponent, because it makes the absolute which exists in itself the top of intellect, but on the contrary, I tried creating the theory of relation which tells all the things are in relation to others. Theory of absolute ideas is directly opposite to the theory which says that intellect is the relationship. But I can’t say my repulsion is against all thoughts of Plato.

But one thing we should consider is, for example, the fact that some kind of the theory of physics is constant. It’s the second matter I’d like to think about. Considering those theories, “intellect” may be certainly absolute and unchangeable.

This dichotomy, intellect as liquidity itself and intellect as the absolute, how can we reconcile these persuasive discourses? The clue to the answer has already been given to us in Bateson’s words.

It’s the word “comparison.” We cannot recognize something is “different” or “same” without comparing. So it’s also an important moment of judging existence. I believe “comparison,” this concept, this act, this phenomenon is the primordial matter to consider intellect, but it’s the missing link which has been lost sight of without examination in the discipline of philosophy. From now on, my long writings begin to tell about that lost moment.

Next chapter 2.The Relation as Intellect


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