この夏に集中的に取り組んでいたマッチング理論に関する新しい論文（どちらも大阪大学博士課程の方元驹さん【注】との共著）が2本完成しました！以下のリンク先から無料で閲覧できますので、ご関心のある方はぜひ😎

I just completed two manuscripts on matching theory, both co-authored with Yuanju Fang (my Ph.D. student at Osaka U.). The link for SSRN is below. You can download them for free!

1. Matching with Subjective and Objective Evaluations

2. Misalignment between Test Scores and Colleges' Preferences: Chinese College Admission Reconsidered

These papers consider the situation in which agents on one side of the market have two different types of ordinal rankings over the agents on the other side. For example, colleges may have BOTH test score order (objective evaluation) and individual preferences (subjective evaluation) over students.

The first paper (very short!) focuses on "double stability", a natural new notion in such an environment. The second paper, based on this new notion, reconsiders the college admission problems in China from the market design perspective.

It would be great if you could take a look😉

【注】方さんは私の指導院生で、中国の高校入試に関するマッチング論文をすでにGamesというゲーム理論系の査読誌から出版しています。こちらもぜひご参照ください。（オープンアクセスです！）
・School Choice in Guangzhou: Why High-Scoring Students Are Protected?