Pragmatistic origin of Gendlin's en#0: with reference to Dewey and Mead
In “A process model,” en#0 is mentioned less often than en#2 and en#3. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that “just because it gets rarely mentioned doesn’t mean it is not structurally important.” (Jaaniste, 2021, April). There are many possible backgrounds for Gendlin’s deliberate assumption of en#0. In my opinion, one of the anticipations of en#0 can be found in the concept of the “natural world” that appears in Dewey’s later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” (Dewey, 1938). Finally, I suggest that we can see some points in the ideas and terminology of en#0 that are closer to Mead than to Dewey.
1. “Natural world” in “Logic: the theory of inquiry”
In the later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,” Dewey discusses something not explicitly mentioned in his earlier work, “Experience and Nature.” It refers to things or a world that have not yet interacted with the organism.
In other words, in the later work, Dewey clearly acknowledges the (potential) existence of things that have not yet interacted with organisms. However, on the other hand, according to Dewey’s definition in this work, “without entering into the life function, such a thing may belong to the “natural world,” but it still cannot be said to belong to the “environment.”
2. Gendlin’s extension of the concept of “environment”
Gendlin also acknowledges the (potential) existence of something that has not yet interacted with the body in the first Chapter of “A Process Model.” He extends Dewey’s definition of “environment” to include such things and the world.
However, Gendlin distinguishes by calling the environment of those that actually enter the life functions “en#2” and those that have not yet entered the life functions “en#0”.
Thus, it can be said that Dewey and Gendlin introduce similar classifications, although they differ in the scope of what they refer to by the term “environment.”
3. Gendlin’s thoroughness of Dewey’s contemplation
Dewey discusses the equivalent of en#0 in “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” outside of the passages I cited earlier.
However, Gendlin would probably not say, “a new organ provides a new way of interacting”. He would not have envisioned pre-separated, fixed organs or systems to which they belong.
4. Mead’s idea of “sensitivity”
Gendlin revisits the concept of en#0 in “Chapter V-A: Intervening Events” of APM. That is, “How does the organism develop new sensitivities to the en?” (Gendlin, 2018, pp. 71-2) and answers the question as follows:
About the terminology in Chapter V-A, it may be said that Gendlin deepened his considerations by inheriting Mead’s idea of “sensitivity” rather than Dewey’s:
References
Dewey, J. (1929). Experience and nature (2nd ed.). Open Court.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: the theory of inquiry. Henry Holt.
Dewey, J. (1981). Experience and nature (The later works, 1925-1953 / John Dewey, Vol. 1, edited by J. A. Boydston). Southern Illinois University Press.
Dewey, J. (1986). Logic: the theory of inquiry (The later works, 1925-1953 / John Dewey, Vol. 12, edited by J. A. Boydston). Southern Illinois University Press.
Gendlin, E. T. (2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.
Jaaniste, L. (2021, April). Posting to “A Process Model Study Group” (Facebook)
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