(Japanese original version is posted to Diamond Online on October 19, 2021)

　　　　　　　　　　Masato Kamikubo
　　　　　　　　　　Professor of Policy Science, Ritsumeikan University

Abstract
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has decided to dissolve the House of Representatives and hold a general election. One of the key focal points of the general election is whether the "opposition coalition" can build an axis of confrontation with the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and New Kōmeitō. With the exception of the Japan Restoration Association, the opposition parties have announced that they have been able to unify their candidates in about 220 of the 289 electoral districts. However, compared to the time of the change of government in 2009, the policies of the opposition coalition are poor.

What is the Japan Communist Party's Terrible Election Strategy?
The "opposition coalition" was realized when the Japan Communist Party (JCP) withdrew its candidates in many constituencies. The JCP, which once fielded candidates in almost every constituency in the country, has fielded only 105 candidates this time.

The JCP and the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) agreed to seek "limited cooperation outside the cabinet" if they win power in the lower house election. Kazuo Shii, chairman of the JCP, praised himself, saying, "This is the first time in the 99-year history of the JCP that it has fought a general election with such an agreement.

However, this is utterly ridiculous. I think that the opposition parties' joint struggle is a very "unreasonable" tactic for the JCP.

In a parliamentary democracy, a "political party" is an organization in which people who agree on the direction of policies gather together, stand many candidates in elections, and fight to gain power and realize their policies by gaining a majority in the parliament.

The JCP, however, says that it will seize power by not running candidates. Without candidates, the voters cannot make a choice. The JCP has lost its qualification to exist as a political party in a parliamentary democracy.

The Democratic Party of Japan's change of government in 2009: What is the difference between now and then?
Pundits who are in favor of the opposition coalition point out that the withdrawal of the JCP's candidate in the 2009 general election helped the DPJ to achieve a change of government. However, I would argue that the situation then was completely different from the current opposition coalition.

At the time, the JCP was losing election after election. This led to a number of "forfeitures of deposit for candidacy" in electoral districts across the country, which worsened the party's financial situation and forced it to reduce the number of candidates.

On the other hand, the momentum of the DPJ toward regime change was very strong. It also won the votes of those who wanted to "punish the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) once and for all" and didn't need the votes of the JCP. That's why the DPJ completely ignored the JCP after it came to power.

The situation was the complete opposite of what it is today, where the CDP responded to the JCP's aggressive stance of "we'll withdraw our candidate, so you can implement our policies.” Now, the CDP, the number one opposition party, has no momentum at all. It relies on the votes of the JCP, which is a shameful situation.

Shameful common policies of the opposition coalition
The policies that the opposition coalition is calling for is even more shameful. The four parties, the CDP, the JCP, the Social Democratic Party, and Reiwa Shinsengumi, have agreed on a "common policy" with an organization called the “Citizens' Alliance for the Abolition of the Security Law and the Restoration of Constitutionalism”.

The six main points of the proposal are: (1) Restore politics based on the Constitution, (2) Strengthen measures against the covid-19 based on scientific knowledge, (3) Correct disparities and poverty, (4) Shift to energy and a decentralized regional economic system that protects the global environment, (5) Realize a free and fair society based on a gender perspective, and (6) Realize a fair and transparent administration that does not allow taking politics into one’s own hand.

However, the reforms to strengthen the leadership of the prime minister, which can be described as the introduction of the British-style "replaceable dictatorship" completed by the governments of Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga, were initiated by politicians in the current opposition parties during their time in the DPJ (Article No. 115). It is unreasonable to say that this is against "constitutionalism", and it is not clear what exactly is in violation of the Constitution.

When the oppositions criticize "personalization of power", what exactly do they mean? For example, in the case of the Moritomo Gakuen issue, it is there is no evidence that the former Prime Minister and his wife took their power into their own hands (Article No. 172). As for (2) to (5), the LDP makes similar policies claims. The differences are not clear.

In addition to Kishida's central pledge to "rebuild a thick middle class through distributional policies", the LDP's pledges also include　the "Digital Rural City State" concept, which aims to revitalize rural areas by shortening the distance between cities and regions through digitalization, and the "Kodomo Manaka (child-centered)” society, which Seiko Noda, the minister in charge of declining birthrates, has called for.

Furthermore, the LDP has begun to broaden the scope of its policies to the centre-left by proposing a "new capitalism" that balances growth and distribution. Its aim is not to differentiate itself from the opposition. Instead, the aim is to blur the distinction between the LDP and the opposition, and to emphasize that the LDP is the only party with the ability to implement its policies. In other words, the aim is to "erase" the existence of the opposition parties (Article No. 286).

There is a serious problem with the opposition coalition. The "common policy” of the opposition parties is a proposal from a group called Citizens’ Alliance. It means that the common policy has not been debated and developed by the opposition parties themselves. If a political party asks an outside group to formulate its policies, it may well be criticized for not being a political party at all.

The 2009 General Election: DPJ developed its vision of government based on a different logic to that of the LDP
The leaders of the CDP are politicians who experienced the change of government in 2009. I would like them to remember their experiences. Since its formation in 1996, the DPJ had spent 13 long years developing its vision of government based on a different logic to that of the LDP.

The LDP government had maintained a "small government" by indirectly protecting the employment of male workers through public works projects and by providing welfare by companies and housewives. However, companies have cut back on corporate welfare in the face of global competition. In addition, the diversification of family forms has made it difficult to maintain family welfare by housewives.

The DPJ therefore envisaged a shift to a European "welfare state" system, in which the government would provide welfare directly. This was expressed in a clear slogan: "From concrete to people". In the DPJ government, public works projects were drastically cut, mainly through a review of 143 dam and conduit projects involving the state, including the Yamba Dam.

On the other hand, the DPJ government incorporated into its budget the European social democratic policies promised in its general election "manifesto": a "child allowance" of 26,000 yen per month for junior high school graduates; free motorways in principle; individual income compensation for farmers; and free high school.

The DPJ also developed the idea of "reforming the system of governance". The DPJ criticized the policy-making under the LDP government for being thrown to the bureaucracy, and proposed the creation of a National Strategy Bureau and a Government Revitalisation Unit, which would formulate the budget framework, key policies and national vision, and coordinate inter-ministerial and intra-governmental policies with ruling party politicians rather than bureaucrats.

From the LDP government to the DPJ: A deeply thought out plans faced obstacles
In addition, the DPJ abolished the Political Affairs Research Council and the ruling party's prior review process, which had been central to policy-making under the LDP government.

The DPJ sought to dismantle the "dual structure of power" by replacing the pre-ruling party review with a "ministry policy meeting" hosted by deputy ministers to exchange views with ruling party lawmakers. This meeting would be held as an official government meeting, and transparency would be ensured by publishing a summary of the proceedings, it said. This was a major difference from the LDP's ruling party pre-examination, which was informal and its contents were not made public.

What was also important was that the "ministry policy meetings" would not, in principle, accept petitions from industry groups and others. Under the DPJ government, petitions from industry groups are received centrally by the secretary-general's office and passed on to the ministers in each ministry. They then draw up bills and submit them to the cabinet. The bills submitted to the Cabinet will be coordinated by the "ministerial committee" and submitted to the Cabinet meeting..

The DPJ also envisaged reforming the Diet, which had been criticised under the LDP regime for being a skeleton because bills submitted to the Diet after prior examination by the ruling party were subject to "restriction on party debate" and the ruling party could not amend them. Specifically, the DPJ proposed a "committee-centered approach," in which “restriction on party debate” on bills would not be imposed during committee deliberations, but would be imposed immediately before the vote. As a result, ruling party lawmakers were able to amend bills in committee. The DPJ attempted to give substance to committee deliberations, which had become a mere formality under the LDP administration.

In short, when the DPJ came to power in 2009, it had a grand vision of radically reforming LDP politics and transforming the national vision in response to globalization. However, the DPJ government was faced with the problem of insufficient financial resources to implement its social democratic policies. In the end, the defeat of the 2010 upper house elections, which resulted in a "twisted parliament" with no majority in the upper house, meant that the whole vision was blocked by the opposition parties at the time, the LDP and New Komeito.

In addition, the DPJ's inability to navigate the bureaucracy and the poor management of the government due to a split in policy orientation within the party, which was criticized as a "yoriai-jyotai(clique)", also contributed to the failure of the reforms.

I do not want to evaluate the DPJ's vision of a national transformation. However, there is no doubt that the politicians of the DPJ spent a great deal of time and effort developing their vision of a new Japan, from the structure of governance to individual policies.

In comparison, the current opposition coalition is failing to present an alternative vision of the nation to the LDP's politics. The opposition coalition is making ridiculous and irresponsible claims about financial resources. I would like to assure that it is impossible to achieve a change of government.